Wealth Effects on Consumption across the Wealth Distribution: Empirical Evidence by Arrondel, Luc et al.
Wealth Effects on Consumption across the Wealth
Distribution: Empirical Evidence
Luc Arrondel, Pierre Lamarche, Fre´de´rique Savignac
To cite this version:
Luc Arrondel, Pierre Lamarche, Fre´de´rique Savignac. Wealth Effects on Consumption across
the Wealth Distribution: Empirical Evidence. PSE Working Papers n2015-06. 2015. <halshs-
01168660>
HAL Id: halshs-01168660
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01168660
Submitted on 26 Jun 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER N° 2015 – 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wealth Effects on Consumption across the Wealth Distribution: 
Empirical Evidence 
 
 
Luc Arrondel 
Pierre Lamarche 
Frédérique Savignac 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D12, E21, C21 
Keywords: Consumption, Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, Policy 
distributive effects, Household survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00 – FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE DES PONTS PARISTECH – ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE – INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE AGRONOMIQUE 
1 
 
Wealth Effects on Consumption across the Wealth Distribution: 
Empirical Evidence
*
 
Luc Arrondel
**
, Pierre Lamarche
***
, Frédérique Savignac
**** 
 
 
June 2015 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the heterogeneity of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth using French 
household surveys. We find decreasing marginal propensity to consume out of wealth across the wealth 
distribution for all net wealth components. The marginal propensity to consume out of financial assets tends to 
be higher compared with the effect of housing assets, except in the top of the wealth distribution. Consumption is 
less sensitive to the value of the main residence than to other housing assets. We also investigate the 
heterogeneity arising from indebtedness and from the role of housing assets as collateral.  
 
Classification: D12, E21, C21 
 
Key words: Consumption, Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, Policy distributive 
effects, Household survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*We would like to thank Henri Fraisse, Arthur Kennickell, Erwan Gautier, Claire Labonne, Julien Matheron, Ernesto 
Villanueva, Jirka Slacalek for helpful discussions and suggestions as well as participants to the Household Finance and 
Consumption Research Workshop (March 2014).  
This paper presents the views of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the ECB or of Banque de 
France. 
** CNRS-PSE , Banque de France. arrondel@pse.ens.fr  
*** European Central Bank. Pierre.Lamarche@ecb.europa.eu 
**** Banque de France. frederique.savignac@banque-france.fr  
2 
 
Non-technical summary 
 
 
The effect of wealth on households’ behavior is a crucial issue for the monetary policy 
transmission to the real economy. Therefore, the link between wealth and consumption is 
widely discussed in the literature. According to the life cycle theory, wealth accumulation is 
used to smooth consumption over the life-cycle. As a result, any unexpected changes in 
wealth resulting from unanticipated developments in stock or housing prices may lead 
households to adapt their consumption. An extensive literature estimates the wealth effect on 
consumption using aggregate data. However the overall consumption may result from the 
aggregation of consumption behaviors that differ across sub-populations, which cannot be 
taken into account in macro-based estimates. In particular, the heterogeneity in the 
composition of the population (renters versus homeowners, stockholders, etc.) together with 
the wealth concentration in the top of the wealth distribution is likely to induce differences in 
consumption behaviors across households. 
This paper aims at providing new insights on the heterogeneity of the wealth effects on 
consumption. It estimates the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (MPC) across the 
whole wealth distribution and accounts for differences in the wealth composition at the 
household level using the French Wealth Survey1 (INSEE) combined with the Household 
Budget Survey (INSEE-EUROSTAT). 
We address the following questions: Is the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth decreasing with wealth? By how much does it vary across the wealth distribution? Is 
the MPC pattern similar for housing and financial assets? Which wealth effects (housing or 
financial wealth) does dominate, depending on the household position in the wealth 
distribution? How does the household’s indebtedness (level and type of collateral) affect the 
MPC? 
Existing macro-based MPC estimates for France (see Slacalek (2009) for instance) 
found small but significant wealth effects on consumption in France, with estimated marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth (MPC) ranging from 0.8 of a cent to 1 cent on annual 
consumption for every 1 euro increase (compared with MPC estimated around 5 cents for the 
U.S or the U.K). Our micro-based results confirm this limited wealth effect on consumption. 
More interestingly, when allowing for heterogeneous wealth effects across the wealth 
distribution, we obtain a decreasing marginal propensity to consume out of wealth along the 
                                                     
1 The French Wealth Survey is part of the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey.  
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wealth distribution. The marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth decreases 
from 11.5 cents in the bottom of the wealth distribution to a non-significant effect in the top 
of the distribution. The marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth decreases from 
1.1 cent in the bottom of the wealth distribution to 0.7 cent in the top of the distribution. For 
most households, the marginal propensity to consume out of financial assets tends to be 
higher compared with the marginal propensity to consume out of housing assets, except in the 
top of the wealth distribution, where the effect is the other way around.  
This paper also contributes to the debate on whether there is a direct wealth effect on 
consumption or whether the correlation between wealth and consumption partly reflects a 
confidence channel. Our MPC estimates are obtained by controlling for household subjective 
income expectations and our results support the views of the existence of a confidence effect 
in addition to the direct wealth effect on consumption. 
We also investigate the collateral effect of housing assets in France and we find larger 
MPC for households that have contracted mortgages, everything else being equal. Such 
differences in the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth are then consistent with a 
possible collateral effect which would lead the consumption of “mortgage households” to be 
more sensitive to housing wealth. Given the institutional features of the mortgage market in 
France, such a result could also reflect a selection effect in the bank lending supply. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Whether or not there is a consumption wealth channel at play is a crucial policy issue, 
especially for the monetary policy transmission to consumer behaviors (see for instance, 
Ludvigson et al., 2002); this is why a large empirical macroeconomic literature (see among 
others Muellbauer, 2010; Carroll et al., 2011 or Aron et al., 2012) aims at evaluating the 
macroeconomic impact of wealth on consumption. However, those macro-based estimates are 
not able to account for heterogeneities in households’ behavior. Indeed, the overall 
consumption may result from the aggregation of consumption behaviors that differ across 
populations. From a theoretical point of view, Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that 
uncertainty over wealth and income may lead the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth to decline as wealth or income increase. Formerly, they show that when households 
have precautionary saving motives, in presence of income uncertainty, the consumption 
function is concave regarding wealth
2
. The intuition behind the decreasing marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth is that wealthy households save for precautionary 
motives proportionally less than none-wealthy ones. Under uncertainty, King (1994) shows 
that credit constraints also induce higher marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. 
Liquidity constrained households cannot adopt their optimal consumption and their 
consumption is more sensitive to wealth (Blinder, 1976). Such heterogeneity in the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth would impact the transmission of prices to consumption 
and is therefore of primary interest for policy design. 
This paper estimates the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (MPC) across 
the whole wealth distribution and accounting for differences in the wealth composition at the 
household level. Existing empirical evidence of the heterogeneity in the marginal propensity 
                                                     
2 Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that uncertainty induces a concave consumption function for a very broad class of utility 
functions. 
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to consume out of wealth depending on the wealth level are scarce. Mian et al. (2013) 
addresse this question relying on geographical prices variations across the U. S. They show 
that ZIP codes with poorer and more levered households have a significantly higher marginal 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth. However, given the data they use, the effect of 
two major features of the household wealth distribution cannot be investigated. First, wealth 
distribution is highly skewed to the right (e.g. Campbell, 2006) meaning that the overall 
consumption-wealth relationship may be driven only by part of the population in the top of 
the wealth distribution. Second, wealth composition, especially the relative shares of financial 
and housing assets in household wealth, varies along the wealth distribution (see Arrondel et 
al., 2014 for euro area countries), leading to differences in wealth shocks exposure along the 
wealth distribution. Some other papers account for possible differentiated marginal 
propensities to consume out of wealth depending on the level of wealth relying on wealth 
survey (Bover, 2005; Bostic et al., 2009; Grant and Peltonen, 2008; Paiella, 2007 or 
Sierminska and Takhtamanova, 2007)3. However, they do not investigate in a more detailed 
way this heterogeneity across the wealth distribution and depending on the wealth 
composition.4 
For such a purpose, household level data covering both wealth and consumption 
distributions are needed (Poterba, 2000; Paiella, 2009). Our paper uses the 2010 French 
Wealth Survey which is specifically designed to measure the wealth distribution in France5. 
This survey provides detailed information on assets composition, debt, income, socio-
demographics and expectations. It also includes some questions about consumption for a 
                                                     
3 Parker (1999), Bover (2005) and Arrondel et al. (2014a) find evidences of decreasing marginal propensity to consume out 
of wealth using respectively U.S., Spanish and French data while Grant and Peltonen (2008) do not find such significant 
differences across wealth levels for Italy. 
4 Another strand of the empirical literature aims at identifying the wealth effects on consumption controlling for heterogeneity 
in households’ behaviors relying on prices dynamics (Attanasio et al. 2009, Browning et al., 2013; Campbell and Cocco 
2007; Disney et al. 2010). These papers studies the MPC heterogeneity across age or homeownership status, but given the 
empirical stategy used (impact of prices dynamics), they cannot examine the MPC heterogeneity arising from net wealth 
composition and wealth inequality. 
5 The French wealth survey is conducted by the National Statistical Institute (INSEE) and is part of the Household Finance 
and Consumption Survey (HFCN, 2013).  
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subsample of households so that we can use a consumption survey, the Household Budget 
Survey (INSEE-EUROSTAT), to measure consumption at the household level, following the 
statistical matching methodology proposed by Browning et al. (2003). We are thus able to 
properly account for both the wealth and the consumption distributions. We then exploit the 
cross-sectional differences in consumption behaviours and wealth (level and composition) 
across households to estimate the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (see Parker, 
1999; Bover, 2005 or Paiella, 2007 for similar approaches). Our empirical model is based on a 
simple consumption function: the consumption-to-income ratio is regressed on the wealth-to-
income ratio and on several control variables accounting for the household life-cycle position, 
preferences, risk exposure, and income expectations. We allow heterogeneous wealth effects 
across the wealth distribution and across net wealth components. We extend the empirical 
literature on the heterogeneity of the wealth effect on consumption in the following ways: 
First, we find a decreasing marginal propensity to consume out of financial and 
housing wealth across the wealth distribution. The marginal propensity to consume out of 
financial wealth decreases from 11.5 cents in the bottom of the wealth distribution to a non-
significant effect in the top of the distribution. The marginal propensity to consume out of 
housing wealth decreases from 1.1 cent in the bottom of the wealth distribution to 0.7 cent in 
the top of the distribution. When ignoring this heterogeneity across the wealth distribution, 
our micro-based estimates are in line with the macro-based ones6: the micro-based estimated 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is about 0.006 for the whole population, 
meaning that one additional euro of net wealth would be associated with 0.6 cent of euro of 
additional annual consumption, and macro-based estimates range from 0.8 of a cent to 1 cent 
on annual consumption for every 1 euro increase (Chauvin and Damette, 2010, Slacalek, 
2009). Our results confirm then the small but significant wealth effects on consumption in 
                                                     
6 In the case of France, the existing MPC estimates were only macro-based ones. This paper is then the first one providing 
quantitative micro-based estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth for France. 
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France (compared with MPC estimated around 5 cents for the U.S or the U.K, see Slacalek 
(2009) for instance); but most importantly, we highlight the heterogeneity in the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth. This heterogeneity is driven both by differences in the 
wealth composition and in the wealth level. Then, we compute the average consumption 
elasticity to wealth in each wealth group in order to investigate the implications for aggregate 
consumption. While the estimated MPC is decreasing with wealth, it is not the case for the 
consumption elasticity to wealth because the wealth concentration in the top of the 
distribution counterbalances the effect of the decreasing marginal propensity to consume out 
of wealth. In other words, average wealth increases more than average consumption across the 
wealth groups (reflecting the skewness of the wealth distribution), so that even with 
decreasing MPC, a one percent of additional wealth has a greater effect on consumption in the 
top of the wealth distribution. 
Second, we examine the role of leverage and liquidity constraints. We compare the 
MPC for subpopulations facing heavy versus light debt pressures. Our results suggest that 
consumption for households facing heavy debt pressures is more sensitive to financial wealth 
except in the bottom of the net wealth distribution, where highly indebted household would 
rather reimburse their debt than consume an additional euro of financial wealth. 
Third, we investigate another possible source for MPC heterogeneity, the collateral 
channel effect of housing wealth: higher housing wealth, everything else being equal, may 
relax financing constraints faced by households who have contracted loans guaranteed by the 
value of their housing assets (mortgages). We find larger values of MPC out of housing 
wealth for households that have loans with real estate collateral. We discuss the institutional 
features of the mortgage market in France and argue that such a result is more likely to reflect 
a selection effect in the bank lending supply policy rather than additional borrowing capacity 
for consumption purposes. 
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Fourth, this paper also contributes to the literature on whether there is a direct wealth 
effect on consumption or whether the correlation between wealth and consumption partly 
reflects a confidence channel (Poterba, 2000; Fenz and Fessler, 2008). We follow Disney et 
al. (2010) and consider a proxy for subjective expectations on future (5 years ahead) total 
income of the household as additional control variable7. We find that the probability to expect 
an increase in the household total income has a positive significant effect on the consumption-
to-income ratio. However, in our case, the introduction of this variable does not affect the 
estimated marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Our results support the views of the 
existence of a direct wealth effect on consumption, in addition to the confidence channel. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and imputation 
strategy. In Section 3 we present our empirical approach and baseline regression. Our main 
results on the heterogeneity of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth are discussed 
in Section 4. Section 5 investigates the role of debt pressure and the existence of a collateral 
channel. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Wealth and consumption at the household level 
2.1. Data sources 
Our empirical analysis is based on the French Wealth Survey (Enquête Patrimoine - 
INSEE). We also use the Household Budget Survey 2006 (HBS, INSEE) to impute 
consumption at the household level in the French Wealth Survey, following the statistical 
matching approach proposed by Browning et al. (2003). 
The French Wealth survey (FWS) is designed to measure household wealth 
distribution. This survey provides detailed information at the household level on housing 
wealth (household main residence, other residences), financial wealth, business assets, debts 
                                                     
7 In the French Wealth Survey, subjective expectations are collected for a subsample of households which is not the same as 
our econometric sample. We then use an in-sample imputation to construct our proxy. 
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(mortgages and other debts), consumption and socio demographic variables (household 
composition, employment status, etc.). We use the 2009/2010 wave which was conducted 
between October 2009 and February 2010. It is a cross-section sample of 15,006 households. 
The sampling design ensures representativeness of the population and accounts for the wealth 
concentration (oversampling of the top of the distribution), see HFCN (2013) for the detailed 
methodology of the survey. 
The measure of consumption is a crucial issue. The best household level information 
about consumption distribution is provided by the Household Budget Surveys (HBS). These 
surveys collect item expenditures by asking households to fill in a very detailed diary. 
Unfortunately the HBS cannot be merged with the FWS for two reasons. First both datasets 
are anonymised and second they do not cover the same sample of households. We 
nevertheless take advantage of the French 2006 Household Budget Survey8 to impute 
consumption in the French wealth survey. 
 
2.2. Consumption measure 
We follow the methodology proposed by Browning et al. (2003) and estimate an 
auxiliary model on the HBS to predict non-durable consumption in the FWS. For that 
purpose, a set of questions about consumption have been included in the French Wealth 
Survey. These questions deal with well-defined and limited parts of the household’s 
expenditures (food consumption at home, food consumption outside the home and utilities). 
These consumption items are also covered by the HBS. First, using the HBS, non-durable 
consumption is regressed on the selected expenditure items (food consumption at home, food 
consumption outside the home and utilities) and on a set of qualitative indicators reflecting 
                                                     
8 The Household Budget Survey surveys for France are conducted by the French National Statistical Institute. 
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regular expenses for 8 other items (clothing, public transport, cultural goods, etc.). 9 Then, the 
coefficients from this auxiliary regression estimated on the HBS are used to impute the non-
durable consumption in the Wealth Survey. The imputation strategy is detailed in Appendix 
A. Various tests have been conducted to evaluate the imputation procedure (see Appendix A). 
In particular, the distributions of the imputed consumption variable in the FWS on the one 
hand and the original variable measured in the HBS on the other hand are very close (see Fig. 
1). Moreover, our consumption measure in the Wealth Survey covers 90% of the National 
Accounts aggregate. 10 
[INSERT FIG. 1] 
2.3. Consumption and wealth distributions 
Table 1 reports summary statistic for consumption, wealth and income distribution based on 
our data11. They are in line with well-known facts about the distributions of consumption, 
wealth and income. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
First, consumption is less unequally distributed than income (e.g. Blundell et al., 2008). In 
France, according to the French Wealth survey, the Gini coefficient for total gross income is 
about 0.38 (and about 0.36 when excluding income from housing and financial assets). For 
non-durable consumption, the Gini coefficient is slightly lower (0.33). The fact that durable 
consumption is less unequally distributed than income is also supported by the ratio of the top 
ten to the median value: top ten durable consumption is less than 2 times more than the 
median, while this ratio is around 2.2 for income. Second, wealth is far more unequally 
distributed than income (e.g. Davies and Shorrocks, 1999). For France, the Gini coefficient of 
                                                     
9 We choose to consider only the available information on the consumption composition in our imputation equation. We do 
not introduce income or other demographic variables in order to avoid “mechanical” correlation between consumption, 
income and wealth when estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. 
10 Considering harmonized definitions in both sources. 
11 Given the sampling design of the survey, we use final weights to compute our descriptive statistics in order to ensure the 
representativeness of the figures. 
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net wealth is about 0.65 and the top ten net wealth is more than 4.4 times the median net 
wealth. Indeed, household wealth (gross and net values) increases dramatically across the 
wealth distribution, especially above the median value (Table 2, columns 1 and 2).  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Such a pattern partly reflects the homeownership rate in France (55%) and the key role played 
by housing assets in the wealth distribution. Indeed, the asset composition varies also a lot 
across the wealth distribution (Fig. 2). Below the 30
th
 gross wealth percentile, household hold 
only financial assets (mainly deposits) and other wealth (durable goods and businesses for 
some of them). Then, the share of housing wealth increases sharply. It reaches about 70% of 
total assets in the p50-p90 gross wealth percentiles. In the top of the distribution, the weight 
of housing assets decreases, and its composition changes: the share of the main residence 
decreases while the share of other housing assets increases. In the top 1%, households hold 
diversified portfolios where financial assets and other assets have more weight than housing 
wealth.12 The composition of their assets is also very specific; in particular business assets 
play a crucial role in explaining their total wealth.  
[INSERT FIG. 2] 
Concerning debts, one also observes differences across the wealth distribution (Table 
2, last column). In the first gross wealth quintile, debt represents about 15% of the value of 
total assets and the average net wealth is negative. This ratio reaches 16% in the p50-p70 
interval and decreases above this threshold. This pattern reflects the fact that most of 
households are indebted to buy their main residence. 
The concentration of wealth combined with the heterogeneity in its composition and 
the crucial role of debt for some households are then likely to induce differences in the 
marginal propensity to consumption out of wealth across the wealth distribution. 
                                                     
12
 Given the oversampling of wealthy people in the French wealth survey, we are able to provide representative figures for the 
top 1%. 
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2.4. Estimation sample and definitions 
Sample selection 
The consumption questions are asked to a (representative) sub-sample of 4,519 
households (among the 15,006 households in the full sample). In order to estimate the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, we exclude households with very specific 
wealth, income or consumption figures: households with very high values of gross wealth 
(above 5 million Euros), very low annual income (below 2,000 Euros) or extremes values in 
the consumption-to-income ratio are then excluded. We also restrict the analysis to 
households where the reference person is aged between 25 and 65 in order to focus on 
household engaged in the working life and to avoid survival bias in old ages. In the end, our 
final estimation sample consists of 3,454 households after cleaning. The composition of the 
econometric sample is very similar to the full sample with slightly lower mean wealth values 
(see Table C1 in Appendix C). 
 
Net wealth components 
In order to account for the heterogeneity in the wealth composition, we split total 
wealth into the following components: 
- Housing wealth includes two components: the household main residence and other 
real estate property (holiday homes, rental homes, excluding real estate property held 
for business purposes). The literature points out that housing wealth has an ambiguous 
impact on consumption (see for instance Cooper, 2013). On the one hand, housing 
satisfies consumption needs and its cost increases with housing prices for all 
households (renters and homeowners) who may have to reduce their non-housing 
expenditure (negative wealth effect)13. On the other hand, it provides also capital 
                                                     
13 In addition, renters may be incited to increase their savings to finance future home acquisition. 
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gains/losses for homeowners who may adapt their consumption plans to these 
(unrealized or realized) housing gains/losses. The role played by the household main 
residence is then likely to be specific as it covers both consumption needs and 
investment motives, while the other real estate properties are more likely to reflect 
investment decisions. 
- Financial wealth includes all financial assets held by the household (deposits, mutual 
funds, shares, voluntary private pensions, whole life insurance and other financial 
assets) but excludes business assets; 
- Other wealth includes assets held for business purposes (land, farms, office space 
rented out to businesses, etc.) and all other remaining assets (vehicles, valuables, etc.). 
For each category of assets, we consider the net values, i.e. the gross value of the 
considered assets less the remaining principal balance of loans contracted for buying these 
assets, using the survey information on the main purpose of each contracted loans (see the 
detailed definition of the variables in the appendix B). 
 
Subjective expectations about income 
The FWS provides useful information on subjective expectations of the reference 
person concerning the expected evolution of the household total income. We construct a 
dummy variable reflecting that the household is optimistic about the future household total 
income (i.e. expects a positive average income growth rate 5 years ahead). Such a variable 
allow disentangling direct wealth effect from a confidence effect14 and has been previously 
considered by Disney et al. (2010). In the FWS, subjective expectations are collected only for 
a subsample of households which is not the same as our estimation sample. We then use an 
in-sample imputation to construct our proxy. We first estimate the linear probability for a 
                                                     
14 Attanasio et al. (2009) and Carroll et al. (2011) argue that the correlation between consumption and wealth may be 
spurious due to omitted common determinants of asset values and consumption such as households’ expectations 
concerning future productivity growth. 
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household to expect a positive evolution of the household income within 5 years depending 
on the detailed household composition, on demographic variables related to the reference 
person as well as on some information about the parents of the reference person. These 
variables aim at accounting for the household permanent income and for the heterogeneity in 
expectations formation. The estimation results (see Table B2 in the Appendix B) show that 
they are highly correlated with our indicator of income expectations. We then use this 
estimated model to impute a similar qualitative indicator of optimism in our main estimation 
sample. The percentage of predicted optimistic households in our estimation sample is very 
close to the observed one in the initial subsample. The imputation strategy and the results are 
detailed in the Appendix B. 
 
3. Empirical analysis: baseline model 
In order to estimate the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth at the household 
level and using cross-sectional information, we follow the empirical approach used by Paiella 
(2007). We consider a simple consumption function based on the life cycle model where 
individuals use wealth accumulation to smooth consumption over their life cycle. In this 
framework, current consumption is proportional to total wealth (i.e. the sum of real non-
human wealth and real human wealth, the latter being defined as the present value of expected 
future income, see Deaton, 1992) and the the link between consumption, income and net 
wealth could be described as: 
 
(1) 
 
where Cht and Yht stand for respectively the consumption and the income (excluding income 
from housing and financial assets) at time t for a given household h. In this model, β1 denotes 

h,tC
Yh,t
 0  1
h,tW
Yh,t
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the propensity to consume out of wealth (or wealth effect). Given that we only have a cross-
section survey, this relationship is estimated relying on the household level heterogeneity. In 
other words, we estimate a long-run relationship linking differences in wealth across 
households and the heterogeneity in their consumption behaviours. To account for life-cycle 
position, preferences, risk exposure, and credit constraint, we control for various individual 
characteristics such as age, work status and diploma of the reference person, household 
composition (number of adults, number of children), a qualitative indicator of credit 
constraints15, and qualitative indicators for past periods of unemployment or health problems. 
We also control for subjective expectations of the reference person concerning the expected 
evolution of the household total income by considering the dummy variable reflecting that the 
household is optimistic about the future household total income (i.e. expects a positive 
average income growth rate 5 years ahead).  
 
Estimation results are reported in Table 3a (without controlling for income expectations16) 
and in Table 3b (controlling for income expectations). Our micro-based estimates show a 
limited wealth effect on consumption in France: the estimated marginal propensity to 
consume out of net wealth is about 0.006, meaning that one additional euro of net wealth 
would be associated with 0.6 cent of euro of additional annual consumption. This result is in 
line with previous results obtained on aggregate data which range from 0.8 of a cent to 1 cent 
on annual consumption for every 1 euro increase (Slacalek, 2009; Chauvin and Damette 
2010).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3a] 
                                                     
15 The qualitative indicator of credit constraints is a dummy variable equals to one when the household answers that it was 
turned down by a lender or creditor, not given as much credit as applied for, or did not apply for credit because of perceived 
constraints. 
16 The results obtained without controlling for income expectations have been previously discussed in Arrondel et al. (2014b). 
16 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3b] 
Significant marginal propensities to consume out of both financial and housing assets are 
obtained when considering net wealth components (Table 2a and 2b, column 3). The 
estimated marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth seems slightly lower (0.2 
cents of a euro) than for other assets (0.7 cents). 
The probability to expect an increase in the household total income has a positive 
significant effect: optimistic households about their future income tend to consume a higher 
share of their current income, everything else being equal. In our case, the introduction of this 
variable does not affect the estimated coefficients of the wealth variable. In other words, these 
results support the views of the existence of direct wealth effect on consumption in addition to 
the confidence channel. 
Socio-demographic variables also have a significant effect on the consumption-to-
income ratio. The age effects are significant and indicate a decreasing pattern of the 
consumption to income ratio over the life course. This age profile could reflect that middle-
aged households do save more than younger ones for precautionary motives or for financing 
consumption in old ages. The negative age effect for older people could reflect a bequest 
motive. There are also significant differences due to the household composition. In particular 
the number of adults is negatively correlated with the consumption-to-income ratio, which 
could be due to some economies of scale. The share of the household income used to finance 
consumption is higher for unemployed, less educated people, for households facing credit 
constraints or that encountered unemployment episodes in the past. 
These baseline regressions provide average MPC estimated for the whole wealth 
distribution. However, given the wealth concentration and the changes in asset composition 
across the wealth distribution illustrated in Section 2, one could suspect that these average 
17 
 
estimates are likely to be affected by some heterogeneity in consumption and saving 
behaviours across the wealth distribution due for instance to differences in preferences, in 
precautionary saving or in accumulation for intergenerational transfer motives. 
 
4. Main results: marginal propensity to consume out of wealth across the wealth 
distribution 
We consider now a more flexible specification where we allow the MPC to vary 
across the net wealth distribution. We define net wealth categories in which the household 
wealth composition is quite homogeneous (see Fig. 2) and introduce dummy variables 
accounting for the households belonging to the considered net wealth position which are 
interacted with the asset values. We consider four net wealth groups defined according to the 
net wealth percentiles: below median net wealth, p50-p69, p70-p89, and p90-p99. The results 
are presented in Table 4. We have also considered other ways of splitting the net wealth 
groups (5 net wealth groups instead of the four ones defined previously) to check for the 
robustness of the results. It does not affect our main conclusions (see Table C2 in the 
Appendix C). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
These estimates confirm the significant marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 
and the differentiated wealth effects depending on the type of assets. Most interestingly, we 
obtain a decreasing marginal propensity to consume out of wealth along the wealth 
distribution. Considering the total net value of assets (net wealth), we obtain a MPC 
decreasing from 3.7 cents of euro (for households below the median net wealth) to about 0.6 
cent of euro in the top of the distribution (Table 4, specification A). In other words, the 
average estimated marginal propensity to consume out of wealth estimated from the baseline 
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model in Table 3 is likely to be biased by the nonlinear effects arising along the wealth 
distribution. 
Such a pattern is confirmed when disaggregating net wealth into its components 
(Table 4, Specifications B, C and D). The marginal propensity to consume out of financial 
wealth decreases from 12.2 cents in the bottom of the wealth distribution to a non-significant 
effect in the top of the distribution. These differences across the wealth distribution, and 
especially the large value of MPC in the bottom of the distribution could be due to specific 
precautionary motives or to credit constraints faced by households with a low level of net 
wealth17. Financial and housing wealth have differentiated effects which vary across wealth 
groups (Table 4, Specification B). In the bottom of the wealth distribution, the financial 
wealth effect dominates the housing one, conversely to the top of the distribution. The 
heterogeneity is much less pronounced for housing wealth than for financial wealth: the 
marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth decreases from 1.4 cent in the bottom 
of the wealth distribution to 0.8 cent in the top of the distribution. Given that housing assets 
are not liquid assets, this housing wealth effect could reflect the consumption sensitivity to the 
“feeling” of being wealthier rather than to effective capital gains. It could also be partly due to 
a collateral effect. This issue is investigated in Section 5. When disaggregating the housing 
wealth into “main residence” and “other real estate” (Table 4, Specification C), the MPC 
decreasing pattern is obtained for both housing components. For a given net wealth group, the 
MPC out of other real estate is significantly higher than the MPC out of the value of the main 
residence (except in the p90-p99 wealth group where there is no significant differences 
between both housing assets). Such a result is coherent with the fact that the wealth 
component “other real estate” could be more easily liquidated or adjusted by households (as it 
                                                     
17 The role of indebtedness and debt pressure is investigated in Section 5. 
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is secondary residences and housing assets held for investment purposes) compared with the 
household main residence.  
Once again, the MPC out wealth estimates obtained in the baseline model in Table 3 
were not able to capture this heterogeneity along the wealth distribution and across wealth 
components. In order to investigate the implications for aggregate consumption, we compute 
the average consumption elasticity to wealth for each wealth group. The average consumption 
elasticity is obtained by multiplying the estimated MPC by the ratio of the average net wealth 
out of the average consumption within the considered wealth group (last column of Table 4). 
The wealth concentration in the top of the distribution (i.e. the fact that the ratio of wealth 
over consumption, W/C, is sharply increasing along the wealth distribution) counterbalances 
the decreasing marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Thus, we obtain an increasing 
average elasticity of consumption to net wealth (from 0.04 to 0.13 in the top of the net wealth 
distribution). This increasing pattern seems to be mainly driven by housing assets: the average 
consumption elasticity to housing wealth increases from 0.01 in the bottom of the net wealth 
distribution to 0.11 in the top. 
When estimating wealth effect on consumption, one potential concern is the spurious 
correlation that may arise from higher expectations about income and future activity which 
may be a common determinant of asset prices and consumption. While we already control for 
household’s income expectations, one could nevertheless worry about a specific correlation 
arising from housing prices. Following Cooper (2013), we conduct an additional regression 
which includes geographical variables to account for the fact that some households may feel 
wealthier than others because they live in more prosperous areas. The available geographical 
indications on the households’ location in the survey are wide geographical areas (9 regions 
for France) and the size of the municipalities where the household main residence is located. 
Adding these explanatory variables does not dramatically change the estimated marginal 
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propensity to consume out of wealth (see Table C3 in the appendix). The small changes in the 
estimated coefficient of the household main residence could reflect a correlation between 
households’ subjective expectations and their subjective evaluation of the value of their main 
residence. 
The potential endogeneity of asset holding decisions is another concern for the 
robustness of the results. One could suspect that some factors that are not observed or not 
fully captured by the control variables (such as tastes, time or risk preferences) may affect 
both consumption and asset allocations. In our case, we are also limited by the survey which 
does not allow observing the household asset holding decisions over time (as it is a cross-
section). This is why we perform additional regressions in order to check whether our results 
continue to hold when restricting the analysis to households that are holding similar types of 
assets, i.e. the homeowners and the stockholders (see Table 5). Those estimates confirm the 
decreasing pattern for MPC, especially as regards the housing wealth for homeowners (from 
6.2 cents below median net wealth to 1.2 cent in the p90-p99 group) and financial wealth for 
stockholders (from 17 cents below median net wealth to 0.4 cent in the top of the 
distribution).  
As expected, for homeowners (respectively for stockholders), we obtain a larger 
marginal propensity to consume out of the value of housing (resp. financial) wealth than for 
the full population. For stockholders, we also obtained a MPC out of housing wealth that is 
closed to the one obtained on the subsample of homeowners, reflecting that most of them 
(96%) are indeed also homeowners. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
All in all, our empirical analysis sheds light on the MPC heterogeneity across 
households. The literature points out several factors that could explain such heterogeneity. 
21 
 
First, our results are in line with the framework leading to a concave consumption function 
with wealth, due to higher precautionary savings for less wealthy households. Second, debt is 
also deemed to play a role in MPC heterogeneity through two channels. The higher value of 
the MPC out of financial wealth observed in the bottom of the wealth distribution could 
reflect liquidity constraints: constrained households cannot adopt their optimal consumption 
and their consumption is therefore expected to be more sensitive to liquid wealth. The role of 
housing as collateral for mortgages could lead to heterogeneous MPCs out of housing wealth: 
higher housing values, everything else being equal, may relax financing constraints faced by 
households who have contracted loans guaranteed by the value of their housing assets 
(mortgages). These issues are investigated in the next section. 
 
5. The role of indebtedness  
5.1. Debt pressure 
In order to investigate whether debt pressure affects consumption behaviors, we split our 
econometric sample according to two indicators of debt pressure (Table 6): 
- The debt-to-asset ratio: we consider a household to be “under pressure” when this ratio 
is above 2 (which corresponds to the 9th decile of this ratio in the population); 
- The debt-service-to-income ratio: we define as “highly indebted” households with a 
ratio above 25% (which corresponds to the 9th decile of this ratio in the population). 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
Concerning financial wealth, the results differ in the bottom and in the top of the 
wealth distribution. In the bottom of the wealth distribution, highly indebted households 
(defined according to the debt-to-asset ratio or to the debt-service-to-income ratio) exhibit a 
non-significant marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth, while other 
households have large marginal propensities to consume out of financial wealth. Such a result 
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may reflect that highly indebted household with low wealth would rather reimburse their debt 
than consume an additional euro of financial wealth. For higher net wealth deciles (p50-p69 
and p70-p89), the MPC out of financial wealth is higher for the samples of highly indebted 
households, which is in line with the idea that the consumption of liquidity constrained 
households is more sensitive to liquid wealth. 
Concerning housing wealth, larger MPCs are obtained for highly indebted households 
in the bottom of net wealth distribution, and the other way around in the top wealth group. In 
the top of the wealth distribution, the results could reflect that wealthy households were able 
to borrow more without constraining their consumption behavior. Concerning less wealthy 
people, the results across the subsamples are in line with the assumption that consumption of 
constrained households is more sensitive to wealth. It would be also in line with a collateral 
channel affecting the consumption of households relying on debt financing and using housing 
wealth as collateral. 
 
5.2. Mortgages: a collateral channel in France? 
In order to investigate whether the wealth effect on consumption differs across 
households depending on the type of loans they have contracted, we disentangle households 
who have loans guaranteed by real estate properties (defined as mortgages) and households 
without mortgages. We estimate the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth for both 
sub-populations (Table 7, column 1 and column 2), and obtain larger values of MPC out of 
housing wealth in the subsample of households that have loans with real estate collateral 
(Table 7, column 1). 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
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Such a finding may be coherent with a collateral channel that reinforces the direct 
housing wealth effect: everything else being equal, the consumption of households with 
mortgages is more sensitive to the value of the housing wealth. Even if our regressions 
include many variables controlling for observable heterogeneity in net wealth composition, 
one could nevertheless worry about the fact that the MPC estimated for “non-mortgage 
households” (Table 7, column 2) results from two types of households that could have very 
heterogeneous behaviours: homeowners without mortgages (i.e. outright owners or 
homeowners who rely on other type of loans) and households without any collateralizable real 
estate property. This is why we conduct an additional regression on the more restricted 
subsample of households without mortgages but who are nevertheless indebted and who held 
at least one real estate property (Table 7, column 3). The estimated MPC out of housing 
wealth for these non-mortgage households are higher than that obtained for the full population 
of “non-mortgage households” (Table 7, column 2) but it remains lower compared with the 
estimated MPC of “mortgage households” (Table 7, column 1), in particular in the bottom of 
the wealth distribution. Such differences in the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 
are then consistent with a possible collateral effect which would lead the consumption of 
“mortgage households” to be more sensitive to housing wealth, everything else being equal.  
However, the collateral effect is likely to be limited in France, because the mortgage 
market is less developed than in some other European countries and is very specific. First, the 
possibility to use mortgages for financing other assets than the collateralized ones was not 
permitted by law before 2007 in France, and it has recently been removed in June 2014. It 
means that using mortgages for financing consumption needs has never been a common 
practice in France (see also European Central Bank, 2009). Moreover, at the time it was 
permitted, the value of the collateral could not be reevaluated over time (fixed to the initial 
collateralized value). Second, when acquiring a property relying on bank loans, two main 
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types of loans can be contracted: either housing loans which are insured through an insurance 
scheme18 or mortgages which are collateralized by housing assets. According to the 2010 
French Wealth Survey19, most of the loans that were contracted to finance the household main 
residence were not mortgages (Table 8): Among the French population, 20.1% of households 
are indebted to finance the household main residence and only 41.1% of them rely on, at least, 
one mortgage loan. In other words, 58.9% of households that are indebted to buy their 
household main residence do not use their real asset as collateral.20 The second main purposes 
for which households are indebted in France is for buying cars or other vehicles (20.1% of 
households). For that purpose, less than 1% of households claim that they use real estate 
property as collateral. And only about 2% of loans whose main purpose is consumption 
financing are mortgages. 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
Given this institutional background, we suspect that the heterogeneity in the MPC out 
of housing wealth could reflect a selection effect in the bank lending supply, i.e. mortgages 
are only offered by banks to very specific households. Indeed, one observes significant 
differences in the average characteristics of indebted households21 depending on the type of 
loans they have, see Table C3 in the Appendix. The “mortgage households” have higher 
income, housing wealth and total debt. They are also more often self-employed and younger 
than the other indebted households. The “mortgage households” may also differ in terms of 
                                                     
18 With the insurance scheme, if repayments are missed, the guarantor pays the lender and simultaneously tries to find 
amicable solutions to the defaulting problem. In theory, if no solution can be found, the guarantor registers a mortgage by 
court order at the borrower's expense and the property may be sold to repay the loan. However, in practice, it seems that the 
entire procedure is very scarcely conducted, so that from the borrower’s point of view there is a clear difference in terms of 
risk between mortgages and insurance scheme. From the lender perspective, the insurance scheme is also preferred as it 
covers the household default risk without implying specific measure or provision for the lender in case of default. 
19 We classify a loan as a mortgage when the household declares that one of the following guaranty is associated with the 
loan: “Hypothèque”, “Inscription en privilège de prêteur de deniers”, “bien immobilier”. All other loans are classified as 
“non mortgages”. 12.6% of households in our econometric sample (i.e. 437 households) have contracted at least one loan 
which is a mortgage.  
20 These figures are coherent with a banking survey conducted annually by the Banque de France, in 2010, most of the 
distributed loans for acquiring a property were insured through an insurance scheme while only about 30% were 
guaranteed by a real estate property (mortgages). 
21 This comparison is done among households holding at least one real estate property (household main residence or other real 
estate) in order to focus on households that have collateralizable assets. 
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unobservable characteristics. They may be more concerned by the value of their housing 
assets, and may have a more accurate evaluation of their wealth, and in the end, may be more 
sensitive to it, compared with households that do not provide any real estate collateral. 
6. Conclusion 
Limited wealth effects on consumption in France are generally found by macro-based 
estimates using aggregate data on household consumption and wealth. However, households’ 
wealth is highly concentrated and its composition (in terms of asset categories and debt 
components) varies a lot across the population. Such heterogeneity cannot be taken into 
account in macro-based estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. 
In this paper, we provide micro-based estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth, controlling for income expectations and investigate its heterogeneity within the 
population.  
As expected, our results confirm the limited wealth effects on consumption in France, 
driven both by housing and financial wealth. Most interestingly, we obtain a decreasing 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth across the wealth distribution. Despite the 
theoretical work of Carrol and Kimball (1996), empirical evidences of such a pattern are 
scarce in the literature. 
Moreover, we contribute to the debate on which wealth effect is the largest one 
(housing or financial wealth effects) and show that the answer depends on the position of 
households in the wealth distribution. In the bottom of the net wealth distribution, the 
marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth dominates the housing wealth effect; 
while in the top of the net wealth distribution, the marginal propensity to consume out of 
financial wealth is not significant. The pattern of wealth effects looks slightly different in 
terms of consumption elasticity to wealth, as the wealth concentration in the top of the 
distribution counterbalances the decreasing marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. 
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Taken together, the heterogeneity in the MPC and in the consumption elasticity has 
various policy implications. On the one hand, the decreasing MPC indicates that the 
consumption of some sub-populations (the less wealthy ones) is more sensitive to a change in 
their asset values. This is why public policies (monetary policy on interest rate or fiscal policy 
on asset revenues for instance) could have distributive effects within the population. 
Heterogeneous MPC are then key factors to be taken into account to analyse the transmission 
of wealth shocks to aggregate consumption (See European Central Bank, 2014). On the other 
hand, our computed elasticity which reflects the wealth concentration within the population 
indicates that the consumption reaction of rich people plays a key role for the overall wealth 
effect on consumption at the aggregate level. We argue that such heterogeneities have to be 
taken into account when performing welfare analysis.  
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Fig 1. Observed (HBS) and imputed distribution (FWS) of non durable consumption 
 
Source: Household Budget Survey and French Wealth Survey (Enquête Patrimoine 2010)  
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Fig 2. Average gross wealth composition by gross wealth percentiles in France 
 
Source: French Wealth Survey (Enquête Patrimoine 2010) - Whole population - Weighted statistics. Housing 
assets: household main residence and other real estate property than the household main residence (holiday 
homes, rental homes, excluding real estate property held for business purposes). Financial assets: deposits, 
mutual funds, shares, voluntary private pensions, whole life insurance and other financial assets (excluding 
business assets). Other assets: assets held for business purposes (land, farms, office space rented out to 
businesses, etc.) and valuables. 
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Table 1. Distributions of non-durable consumption, net wealth and income 
 
Source: French Wealth Survey (Enquête Patrimoine 2010) and Household Buget Survey (Enquête Budget de 
famille 2006)- Whole population - Weighted statistics. 
 
 
Table 2. Mean values of gross and net wealth and share of asset categories and debt in 
total across the wealth distribution  
 
Source: French Wealth Survey (Enquête Patrimoine 2010) - Whole population - Weighted statistics 
Financial assets: deposits, mutual funds, shares, voluntary private pensions, whole life insurance and other 
financial assets (excluding business assets). Other housing assets: other real estate property than the household 
main residence (holiday homes, rental homes, excluding real estate property held for business purposes). Other 
assets: assets held for business purposes (land, farms, office space rented out to businesses, etc.) and valuables. 
Debt: all various forms of debt contracted by the household (mortgage debt, non-collateralized debt including 
debt contracted for business purposes).  
  
Non durable 
consumption
Net wealth
Total Income Excl. Capital income
Mean (euros) 24,500 229,300 36,900 32,700
Median (euros) 22,300 114,500 29,200 26,900
P90/Median 1.99 4.42 2.20 2.16
Gini 0.33 0.65 0.38 0.36
Income
Gross wealth 
percentiles 
Gross wealth Net wealth
Financial 
wealth
Main 
residence
Other 
housing 
assets
Other 
Assets
Debt
0-25 9,700 -700 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.15
25-50 76,100 49,400 0.34 0.36 0.05 0.25 0.13
50-70 208,500 174,400 0.16 0.66 0.05 0.13 0.16
70-90 370,800 340,200 0.15 0.60 0.09 0.16 0.12
90-99 876,200 812,600 0.17 0.44 0.22 0.17 0.10
99-100 4,486,200 4,256,200 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.07
All 259,000 229,300 0.20 0.48 0.14 0.18 0.12
Mean values Shares in total  assets
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Table 3a. Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth: baseline results 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets).  
OLS estimates. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. Econometric sample.  
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Wealth
Gross  wealth 0.005 *** 0.001  -  -  -  -
Net wealth  -  - 0.006 *** 0.001
Financia l  wealth  -  -  -  - 0.002 *** 0.001
Main res idence  -  -  -  - 0.007 *** 0.001
Other rea l  estate  -  -  -  - 0.007 *** 0.001
Other assets  -  -  -  - 0.007 *** 0.001
Age
25 to 29 ref. ref.
30 to 39 -0.125 *** 0.033 -0.124 *** 0.033 -0.125 *** 0.033
40 to 49 -0.130 *** 0.032 -0.132 *** 0.032 -0.135 *** 0.032
50 to 59 -0.214 *** 0.032 -0.218 *** 0.032 -0.222 *** 0.032
60 to 69 -0.165 *** 0.038 -0.172 *** 0.039 -0.174 *** 0.039
70 to 75 -0.173 *** 0.044 -0.181 *** 0.044 -0.180 *** 0.044
Situation on labour market
Sel f-employed 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.023
Employee ref.   - ref.  - ref.  - 
Reti red 0.052 * 0.027 0.052 * 0.027 0.051 * 0.027
Unemployed 0.098 *** 0.031 0.096 *** 0.031 0.096 *** 0.031
Others 0.127 *** 0.042 0.132 *** 0.042 0.139 *** 0.042
Education
No diploma ref.  - ref.  - ref.  - 
Primary or Secondary -0.041 ** 0.019 -0.041 ** 0.019 -0.040 ** 0.019
Baccalaureate -0.068 *** 0.025 -0.067 *** 0.025 -0.064 *** 0.025
Post-secondary -0.093 *** 0.026 -0.092 *** 0.026 -0.089 *** 0.026
Tertiary -0.162 *** 0.022 -0.160 *** 0.022 -0.155 *** 0.022
Household composition
Number of adults -0.174 *** 0.013 -0.173 *** 0.013 -0.173 *** 0.012
Number of chi ldren 0.011 * 0.007 0.012 * 0.007 0.012 * 0.007
Credit constraint 0.078 *** 0.020 0.078 *** 0.020 0.076 *** 0.020
Unemployment episodes
Long periods  of unemployment 0.049 ** 0.020 0.048 ** 0.020 0.048 ** 0.020
Short periods  of unemployment 0.043 ** 0.020 0.044 ** 0.021 0.045 ** 0.020
Past sick leaves 0.037 0.042 0.034 0.042 0.033 0.042
Intercept 1.201 *** 0.039 1.202 *** 0.039 1.201 *** 0.039
R² 0.153 0.154
# observations 3,454 3,454
0.157
3,454
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Table 3b. Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth: baseline results accounting for subjective income expectations 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets).  
OLS estimates. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. Econometric sample. .  
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Wealth
Gross  wealth 0.005 *** 0.001  -  -  -  -
Net wealth  -  - 0.006 *** 0.001
Financia l  wealth  -  -  -  - 0.002 *** 0.001
Main res idence  -  -  -  - 0.007 *** 0.001
Other rea l  estate  -  -  -  - 0.007 *** 0.001
Other assets  -  -  -  - 0.007 *** 0.001
Positive income expectations 0.002 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001
Age
25 to 29 ref. ref.
30 to 39 -0.096 *** 0.036 -0.093 *** 0.034 -0.095 *** 0.036
40 to 49 -0.070 * 0.045 -0.068 * 0.045 -0.072 * 0.045
50 to 59 -0.127 ** 0.055 -0.127 ** 0.054 -0.131 ** 0.055
60 to 69 -0.063 0.065 -0.064 0.065 -0.065 0.065
70 to 75 -0.061 0.072 -0.062 0.072 -0.060 0.072
Situation on labour market
Sel f-employed 0.030 0.024 0.038 * 0.024 0.035 0.024
Employee ref. ref.  - ref.  - 
Reti red 0.063 ** 0.028 0.063 ** 0.028 0.063 ** 0.028
Unemployed 0.103 *** 0.031 0.101 *** 0.031 0.101 *** 0.031
Others 0.145 *** 0.043 0.150 *** 0.043 0.157 *** 0.043
Education
No diploma ref.  - ref.  - ref.  - 
Primary or Secondary -0.042 ** 0.019 -0.041 ** 0.019 -0.040 ** 0.019
Baccalaureate -0.068 *** 0.025 -0.067 *** 0.025 -0.064 *** 0.025
Post-secondary -0.088 *** 0.026 -0.086 *** 0.026 -0.083 *** 0.026
Tertiary -0.164 *** 0.022 -0.162 *** 0.022 -0.157 *** 0.022
Household composition
Number of adults -0.174 *** 0.013 -0.173 *** 0.013 -0.173 *** 0.012
Number of chi ldren 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007
Credit constraint 0.079 *** 0.020 0.079 *** 0.020 0.078 *** 0.020
Unemployment episodes
Long periods  of unemployment 0.049 *** 0.020 0.049 ** 0.020 0.049 ** 0.020
Short periods  of unemployment 0.044 * 0.020 0.044 ** 0.021 0.045 ** 0.020
Past sick leaves 0.032 ** 0.042 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.042
Intercept 1.002 *** 0.102 1.007 *** 0.102 1.004 *** 0.102
R² 0.154 0.155
# observations 3,454 3,454
0.158
3,454
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Table 4. Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and average elasticity across the wealth distribution 
 
 
  
(2) (3) (4)=(1)*(2)/(3)
W C 
Consumption 
elasticity to 
wealth
Wealth 
percentile 
dummy Coefficient Std. Err. (mean - euros)  (mean-euros)
Net wealth
p1-p49 0.037 *** 0.005 25,900 22,014 0.044
p50-p69 0.013 *** 0.002 181,000 23,700 0.096
(A) p70-p89 0.010 *** 0.001 354,150 28,200 0.123
p90-p99 0.006 *** 0.001 846,200 35,800 0.133
Control  variables yes
R² 0.168
Financia l  assets
p1-p49 0.122 *** 0.014 8,000 22,000 0.044
p50-p69 0.020 *** 0.008 26,400 23,700 0.022
p70-p89 0.013 ** 0.006 52,800 28,200 0.024
p90-p99 0.002 0.001 178,100 35,800 0.009
Hous ing wealth
p1-p49 0.014 ** 0.006 14,650 22,000 0.009
(B) p50-p69 0.009 *** 0.002 139,700 23,700 0.051
p70-p89 0.008 *** 0.002 269,800 28,200 0.080
p90-p99 0.008 *** 0.001 519,300 35,800 0.116
Other assets
p1-p49 0.025 ** 0.008 1,300 22,000 0.002
p50-p69 0.035 *** 0.008 14,000 23,700 0.020
p70-p89 0.014 *** 0.003 29,000 28,200 0.015
p90-p99 0.006 *** 0.001 261,800 35,800 0.044
Control  variables yes
R² 0.175
Specification Regression results
(1)
Marginal propensity to 
consume wealth
Computation of elasticities
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Table 4 (continued). Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and average elasticity across the wealth distribution 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets). Other 
control variables: income expectations, age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit constraint, 
unemployment episodes, sick leaves. 
OLS estimates. Econometric sample. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
.  
(2) (3) (4)=(1)*(2)/(3)
W C 
Consumption 
elasticity to 
wealth
Wealth 
percentile 
dummy Coefficient Std. Err. (mean - euros)  (mean-euros)
Main res idence
p1-p49 0.012 *** 0.006 14,650 22,000 0.008
p50-p69 0.007 *** 0.003 128,500 23,700 0.039
p70-p89 0.009 *** 0.002 233,200 28,200 0.073
p90-p99 0.008 *** 0.002 332,000 35,800 0.077
Other rea l  estate
p1-p49 0.030 ** 0.015 700 22,000 0.001
( C) p50-p69 0.023 *** 0.008 16,400 23,700 0.016
p70-p89 0.006 *** 0.004 41,600 28,200 0.008
p90-p99 0.008 *** 0.001 233,600 35,800 0.051
Other assets p1-p49 0.026 *** 0.008 1,300 22,000 0.002
p50-p69 0.035 *** 0.008 14,000 23,700 0.021
p70-p89 0.014 *** 0.003 29,000 28,200 0.015
p90-p99 0.006 *** 0.001 261,800 35,800 0.044
Control  variables yes
R² 0.184
Computation of elasticities
Marginal propensity to 
consume wealth
Specification Regression results
(1)
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Table 5. Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth : subsamples of homeowners and stockholders 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets). Other 
control variables: income expectations, age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit constraint, 
unemployment episodes, sick leaves.OLS estimates Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
  
Wealth variables
Wealth 
percentile
Homeowners Stockholders
(1) (2)
Coeff. Coeff.
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Financia l  Wealth
p1-p49 0.086 *** 0.170 ***
0.030 0.032
p50-p69 0.023 * 0.018
0.012 0.015
p70-p89 0.023 *** 0.023 ***
0.006 0.009
p90-p99 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
0.001 0.002
Hous ing wealth
p1-p49 0.062 *** 0.055 *
0.007 0.034
p50-p69 0.031 *** 0.032 ***
0.003 0.009
p70-p89 0.019 *** 0.020 ***
0.002 0.004
p90-p99 0.012 *** 0.012 ***
0.001 0.001
Other wealth
p1-p49 0.013 * 0.023
0.008 0.055
p50-p69 0.030 *** 0.032
0.010 0.039
p70-p89 0.013 *** 0.031 ***
0.003 0.009
p90-p99 0.007 *** 0.008 ***
0.001 0.002
Control  
variables yes yes
R² 0.266 0.302
#observations 2,364 837
35 
 
Table 6. Differences across households groups: debt pressure 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets). 
Other control variables: income expectations, age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, 
credit constraint, unemployment episodes, sick leaves. 
OLS estimates. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. Econometric sample 
Wealth variables Wealth percentile ratio>2 ratio<2 ratio >0,25 ratio <0,25
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Financia l  Wealth
p1-p49 0.017 0.117 *** 0.041 0.124 **
0.044 0.015 0.062 0.015
p50-p69 0.068 ** 0.021 *** 0.030 0.021 ***
0.034 0.008 0.041 0.008
p70-p89 0.042 *** 0.013 ** 0.054 ** 0.013 ***
0.016 0.006 0.022 0.006
p90-p99 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.000
0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
Hous ing wealth
p1-p49 0.032 ** 0.016 ** 0.041 *** 0.013 ***
0.016 0.007 0.016 0.007
p50-p69 0.03 *** 0.009 *** 0.019 ** 0.010 ***
0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003
p70-p89 0.018 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 ** 0.009 ***
0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002
p90-p99 0.013 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.009 ***
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Other wealth 0.006 *** 0.007 0.006 *** 0.008 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Control  variables yes yes yes yes
R² 0.258 0.177 0.227 0.184
#observations 550 2904 527 2927
Debt to asset ratio Debt service to income ratio
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Table 7. Differences across households groups: indebtedness and collateral 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets). 
Other control variables: income expectations, age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, 
credit constraint, unemployment episodes, sick leaves. In column 1, the econometric sample is restricted to the households 
with at least one mortgage (i.e. a loan with one of the following associated guaranties: “Hypothèque”, “Inscription en 
privilège de prêteur de deniers”, “bien immobilier” while the results for the other households (without mortgages are in 
column 2). Column 3 reports the results for a sub-population of column 2: households without mortgages but who are 
nevertheless indebted and have at least one real estate property. OLSE estimates. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
Econometric sample 
 
  
Wealth variables
Wealth 
percentile
With loans 
guarantied by  real 
estate collateral
All
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Financia l  Wealth
p1-p49 0.045 0.117 *** 0.204 ***
0.079 0.015 0.047
p50-p69 0.060 * 0.021 *** 0.018
0.036 0.008 0.026
p70-p89 0.042 ** 0.013 ** 0.028 **
0.019 0.006 0.011
p90-p99 0.005 0.001 0.004 **
0.004 0.001 0.002
Hous ing wealth
p1-p49 0.078 *** 0.012 * 0.048 ***
0.019 0.006 0.011
p50-p69 0.034 *** 0.010 *** 0.032 ***
0.010 0.003 0.005
p70-p89 0.020 *** 0.008 *** 0.021 ***
0.005 0.002 0.003
p90-p99 0.012 *** 0.008 *** 0.011 ***
0.002 0.001 0.001
Other wealth 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.009 ***
0.002 0.001 0.001
Control  variables yes yes yes
R² 0.227 0.178 0.247
#observations 437 3,017 1,166
 Indebted 
households with a 
real estate property
Without loans guarantied by  real 
estate collateral
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Table 8. Percentage of indebted households  
      
Purpose of the loans 
% of households with 
one loan (or more) 
contracted for the 
following purpose 
% of households with at least one 
mortgage for financing the 
associated purpose (among HH 
declaring the associated purpose)  
      
Main residence  20.1 41.2 
Other real estate 6.3 36.9 
Renovation works 6.8 7.4 
Cars, vehicles 20.1 0.5 
Others (consumption) 9.9 2.3 
Business 5.6 2.6 
All purposes 47.6 22.7 
 
Among the French population, 20.1% of households are indebted to finance the household main residence. 
Among these households, 41.1% rely on, at least, one mortgage loan (defined as loan with one of the following 
associated guaranty “hypothèque”, “Inscription en privilege de prêteurs de deniers” or “bien immobilier”). 
Source: French Wealth Survey (Insee) - Whole population -Weighted statistics. 
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Appendix A: Consumption variable 
The introduction of a limited number of questions to measure consumption in wealth surveys 
has been underlined as a useful line of harmonization in order to monitor the existence and the 
magnitude of a wealth effect on consumption choices (Browning et al., 2003).22 Instead of 
asking one question on the total amount spent for (non-durable) consumption purposes, 
Browning et al. (2003) recommend to ask a limited number of questions about very precise 
and limited parts of their expenditures23: food consumption at home, food consumption 
outside the home and utilities (water expenditures, electricity, fuel and communications).  
Such an approach has been adopted in the core questionnaire of the HFCS. 
Once these components have been measured in the wealth survey, the approach consists in 
estimating, on data from a standard Household Budget Survey, a sort of empirical Engel 
curve, mapping expenditures in good j to total expenditures on non-durable goods along with 
other personal characteristics of the household (family size, location, …) according to the 
following linear relationship: 
(A1)  jjndurjjj uzcc    
where ndurc  is non durable consumption and ),...,( 1 Lcc  the limited set of expenditures.  
If coefficient j  is not equal to zero, the inverse reationship gives the total consumption as a 
function of consumption in good j and other covariables. A set of weighting coefficients 
Lj ,...,1)(  summing to 1, leads to the following imputation equation in the wealth survey: 
(A2)  
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22 Browning et al. (2003) explain that the best way to obtain accurate information on consumption at the household level is to 
conduct surveys focusing on consumption, where households have to fill in diaries, as it is done by the Household Budget 
Survey (HBS, Eurostat) for example. Obviously, such an approach cannot be implemented in a survey where the core output 
(assets and liabilities assessment) is already per se a difficult task that requires a long and demanding questionnaire.  
23 They show that households seem to be able to provide more reliable information for these precise questions than for an 
aggregate amount. 
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Application to the French Household wealth survey 
A set of questions on expenditures has been introduced in the French Household Wealth 
Survey 2010 (CAPI survey). These questions were asked to a random and representative 
subsample of one third of the full sample (4,519 households among the 15,006 in the full 
sample).The full set of questions about consumption is the following:  
[Q1.] Over the last 12 months, how much have you spend, on average per 
month, for food at home (excluding food consumption in restaurants), 
considering every member of your household? 
[Q2.] And how much do you spend, for your household as a whole, for food 
taken outside home (including school or at-work restaurants, fast-food, 
meals and sandwiches at the workplace)? 
[Q3.] Over the last 12 months, how much have you spend, for water, 
electicity and gas, heating and communication bills (telephone and web 
connexion)? 
[Q4-Q11.] Over the last 12 months has any member of your household had 
regular expenses regarding:  
o clothing 
o public transport (train, bus, plane, subway and taxi) 
o other transport with motorized vehicle or bicycle (gas expenses, 
insurance, etc. but not the vehicle acquisition expenses themselves) 
o on cultural and recreational goods or services (books, movies, music, 
concert, museum and art exhibitions, etc.) 
o other forms of recreational goods or services 
o health (expenses not covered by public or employer insurance scheme) 
o children education or childcare 
o personal services (housekeeping, gardenkeeping, other) 
 
[Q12.] How much do you spend, on an average month, for your usual 
consumption only (food, clothes, heating, transports, leisure, various 
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services,…), excluding rents, repayments, large expenditure on durables 
(e.g. buying a car, a refrigerator, a washing-machine, furnitures,…)? 
 
 
Imputation procedure 
1. Non durable consumption (equation (A2)) is estimated on the French HBS 2006 using 
the following specification:  
(A3) uCc indur    1'loglog  
where C is the vector of non zero or missing log consumption (food at home, food outside the 
home, utilities) and  i1 are the dummies on regular expenses (Q4-Q11).  
Aggregate components of consumption were computed in HBS according to the COICOP 
classification and binary variable on regular expenses (Q4-Q11) were computed in HBS under 
the assumption that regularity of consumption of an item is closely correlated to the 
expenditure on this item: for instance 50% of the household in the FWS report regular 
expenses on clothes, therefore a household reporting these expenses in HBS is considered to 
be a regular consumer of clothes if the amount reported is in the upper half of the distribution.  
The regression model shows a good fit with a R² equal to 78%. Imputation also accounts for 
potential heteroscedasticity in expenditures amounts: in addition to the predictive part of the 
model, a residual component is drawn from the observed residual distribution conditional on 
observables (using hot-deck imputation, in order to address potential heteroskedasticity of 
residuals coming from the regression performed on HBS data) and added to the best 
prediction. 
2. Imputation of total non-durable consumption in the FWS 
The total non-durable consumption in the Household wealth survey is then imputed using the 
estimates obtained from the HBS and applying the same model. 
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Comparisons between imputed consumption in the wealth survey and the HBS 
When comparing the data from the FWS and those from the HBS, the distributions for 
consumption items (food at home, food outside the home and utilities) are very close in both 
sources (Fig. A1). As these three variables are explanatory variables in our imputation model 
with a high degree of explanatory power, this good comparability determines the good match 
for the imputed non-durables consumption distribution in the Wealth Survey with the 
distribution measured in the HBS (Fig 1). Furthermore, the link between consumption and 
income is preserved (Fig A2). The results on income elasticity of food at home consumption 
and non-durables consumption are both comparable to those given by HBS 2006 (estimated 
income elasticity for food at home consumption: 0.43, estimated elasticity for non-durables 
consumption: 0.42). Finally we analyze the variability of our estimations. To do so, we 
replicate our imputation taking into account the uncertainty for the parameter estimation (Fig 
A3). These replications involve drawing residuals (which reflects the uncertainty due to the 
non-explained part of the equation) and drawing coefficients of the equation (using a normal 
law and parameters estimated with OLS, in order to reflect the uncertainty related to the 
estimation of the equation). We obtain that the uncertainty due to the imputation stands for 
about 0.8% of the mean. 
 
Comparisons with aggregate figures (national accounts) 
Table A1 provides comparison between the 2009 National accounts and our survey measure. 
To get comparable figures with the survey definitions of non-durable consumption, we 
subtract durables consumption, insurance primes, and imputed rents. We then obtain that our 
imputed non-durable consumption covers about 90% of the non-durable consumption 
measured with the National accounts. 
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Tab A.1 – Comparison of the average consumption and disposable income in the 
national accounts and using our survey results (euros) 
  
 
Consumption 
 
Disposable 
income 
Average total amount in NA (1) 
 
38,200 
 
45,700 
Including: 
    
 Durables goods (2) 
 
3,600 
 
- 
 Imputed rents (3) 
 
5,500 
 
5,500 
 Insurance services (4) 
 
1,300 
 
1,600 
 FISIM (5) 
 
500 
 
500 
Applying the survey definition to 
National Accounts (a)=(1)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(5)  
27,300 
 
38,100 
Measured using the surveys (b) 
 
24,500 
 
34,600 
Coverage rate (b)/(a)   90%   91 % 
Sources: National Accounts (a), French Wealth Survey and Household Budget Survey (b) 
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Fig. A1 - Observed distributions of consumption items in the HBS and in the FWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Insee, Household Budget Survey 2006 and Household Wealth Survey 2010. 
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Fig. A2 – Correlation between consumption and income 
  
Source: Insee, French wealth survey, 2010. 
 
Fig.A3 – Variability of the distribution of non durables consumption 
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Appendix B: Other variables definitions 
 
Net wealth components 
For each category of assets, we consider the net values, i.e. the gross value of the considered 
assets less the remaining principal balance of loans contracted for buying these assets, using 
the survey information on the main purpose of each contracted loans.  
Net value of household main residence (HMR) is the value of the HMR less the remaining 
principal balance of loans contracted for buying the household main residence.  
Net value of other real estate is the gross value less the remaining principal balance of loans 
contracted for buying other real estate property (excluding businesses). 
Net financial wealth is gross financial wealth less remaining principal balance of loans 
contracted for consumption purposes (excluding durable goods). 
Net other wealth is gross other wealth less remaining principal balance of loans contracted for 
businesses or for buying durable goods. As explained in section 5, due to the institutional 
features of the credit market in France, very few loans are using a property (HMR or other 
real estate) as collateral for other purpose than financing the collateralized asset (see Table 5 
in section 5). When it is the case, these loans are taken into account in the net value of “other 
wealth”. 
 
Measure of income expectations 
The French wealth survey collects information on household’s income expectations through a 
probabilistic question. This question is asked in a specific module dealing with preferences 
and expectations. In order to limit the questionnaire duration, this module is asked only to a 
representative subsample (one third of the full sample, 4725 respondents) which is not the 
same as the subsample asked about consumption expenditure (there is no overlapping 
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between the two sub-samples). So we need to compute a household-specific measure of 
income expectations in our econometric sample (subsample asked about consumption). To 
this aim, we first estimate the probability for a household to be “optimistic” about the future 
household income in the subsample where the expectations question is asked, and then we 
compute the estimated probability to have “optimistic” expectations for each household in our 
econometric subsample. 
Expectations of the reference person concerning the evolution of the household income are 
elicited using the following question: 
Concerning the total income of your household, please try to imagine how your income will 
evolve within 5 years… 
You have 100 percentage points to allocate among the 7 choices below: 
The total income of your household will: 
- increase by [more than 25%, 10% to 25%, less than 10%] 
- be the same as today, 
- decrease by [less than 10%, 10% to 25%, more than 25%] 
We compute the mean expected changes for each respondent by considering the mean value 
of each bracket and the percentage points associated with each choice. We define as 
“optimistic households” when the respondent expects a positive mean changes for total 
income over the 5 coming years.  
Then we estimate the linear probability for a household to expect a positive evolution of the 
household income within 5 years depending on the detailed household composition, on 
demographic variables (age, age squared, detailed social status, education) of the reference 
person as well as on some information about the parents of the reference person (main 
professional activity of the father of the reference person during the childhood of the 
reference person). These variables aim at accounting for the household permanent income and 
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for the heterogeneity in expectations formation. The estimation results (Table B2) show that 
they are highly correlated with our indicator of income expectations. When using this 
estimated model to impute a similar qualitative indicator of optimism in our econometric 
subsample, the percentage of predicted optimistic households is very close to both the 
observed and estimated percentages in the subsample “expectations and preferences” (Table 
B1). 
 
Table B1. Indicators of income expectations: quality of fit 
 
  
Average 
expected 
changes in 
income (%)
% of 
"optimistic" 
households
Observed 3.25 56.3
Estimated 3.13 56.5
Econometric subsample Predicted 1.56 52.2
Subsample "expectations 
and preferences"
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Table B2. Determinants of the probability to expect a positive change in the household total income 
 
Dependent variable: dummy variable equals to one if the household expected income change over the 5 coming years is 
positive, equals to zero otherwise. Linear probability model (OLS estimates). Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
Representative subsample of the specific module of the FWS on “expectations and preferences”. 
Social status of  the reference person (RP)
Farmer ref.
craftsman, merchant 0.062 0.043
Industria l i s t -0.063 0.086
Libera l  profess ion 0.036 0.058
Executive 0.143 *** 0.042
White col lar (higher grade) 0.134 *** 0.039
White col lar (lower grade) 0.061 0.040
Blue col lar (higher grade) 0.090 ** 0.041
Blue col lar (lower grade) 0.025 0.050
Retired-Farmer 0.093 * 0.056
Retired independent workers  or buss inessman 0.143 ** 0.051
Retired l ibera l  profess ion or executive 0.052 0.047
Retired white col lar (higher grade) 0.069 0.045
Retired white col lar (lower grade) 0.067 0.045
Retired blue col lar 0.114 *** 0.045
Unemployed -0.019 0.049
Education of RP
 No diploma ref. 
Primary or Secondary -0.005 0.020
Baccalaureate -0.013 0.028
Post-secondary -0.056 * 0.031
Tertiary -0.016 0.030
Age of RP -0.027 *** 0.003
Age square of RP 0.000 ** 0.000
Social status the father  during the childhood of the RP
Farmer ref.
craftsman, merchant 0.064 ** 0.026
Industria l i s t 0.085 ** 0.039
Libera l  profess ion 0.022 0.045
Executive 0.103 *** 0.028
White col lar (higher grade) 0.118 *** 0.032
White col lar (lower grade) 0.065 *** 0.023
Blue col lar 0.058 *** 0.021
Unemployed 0.013 0.085
Family composition
One adult ref.
One adult with chi ldren -0.023 0.028
Couple without chi ldren -0.043 ** 0.019
Couple with chi ldren 0.009 0.021
Others 0.025 0.041
Intercept 1.381 *** 0.084
R² 0.153
# observations 4,725
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Summary statistics: means values 
 
Source: French Wealth survey (Enquête Patrimoine 2010). Full sample: whole population.    
Variables Full sample
Consumption 
Sub-sample 
Econometric 
sample
Gross wealth 258,958 265,330 254,861
Net wealth 229,259 235,231 220,654
Financial assets 50,840 52,023 44,593
Main residence 122,419 129,177 137,786
Other real estate 38,124 39,418 39,130
Other assets 47,574 44,712 33,352
Consumption - 27,057 25,486
Income (excluding income from 
housing and financial assets)
32,567 32,841 36,143
Income Expectation (positive) 
over 5 years
0.520 0.507 0.522
Age
25 to 29 0.115 0.110 0.074
30 to 39 0.173 0.187 0.224
40 to 49 0.180 0.193 0.231
50 to 59 0.175 0.183 0.214
60 to 69 0.158 0.147 0.177
70 to 75 0.113 0.105 0.081
More than 75 0.086 0.074 0.000
Employment status
Self-employed 0.063 0.050 0.050
Employee 0.488 0.527 0.611
Retired 0.345 0.316 0.253
Unemployed 0.058 0.056 0.031
Others 0.046 0.051 0.055
Education
No diploma 0.184 0.160 0.147
Primary or Secondary 0.447 0.447 0.447
Baccalaureate 0.134 0.134 0.127
Post-secondary 0.104 0.095 0.103
Tertiary 0.133 0.164 0.176
Household composition
Number of adults 1.575 1.578 1.624
Number of children 0.655 0.665 0.792
Credit constraint 0.114 0.122 0.130
Unemployment episods
Long periods of unemployment 0.134 0.139 0.152
Short periods of unemployment 0.117 0.127 0.139
Past sick leaves 0.035 0.034 0.035
# observations 15,006 4,519 3,454
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Table C2. Robustness of Regression results: Considering 5 wealth groups instead of 4 groups 
 
  
Specification
(2) (3) (4)=(1)*(2)/(3)
W C 
Consumption 
elasticity to 
wealth
Wealth percentile 
dummy Coefficient Std. Err. (mean - euros)  (mean-euros)
Net wealth
p1-p29 0.162 *** 0.024 1,500 22,800 0.011
p30-p39 0.098 *** 0.015 28,500 27,300 0.102
(A) p40-p79 0.014 *** 0.001 177,700 25,400 0.097
p80-p89 0.010 *** 0.001 401,100 32,800 0.122
p90-p99 0.006 *** 0.001 1,096,300 38,700 0.162
Control  variables yes
R² 0.178
Financia l  assets
p1-p29 0.433 *** 0.051 2,100 22,800 0.040
p30-p39 0.152 *** 0.028 16,300 27,300 0.091
p40-p79 0.025 *** 0.006 29,000 25,400 0.029
p80-p89 0.022 *** 0.007 71,100 32,800 0.048
p90-p99 0.002 * 0.001 263,000 38,700 0.013
Hous ing wealth
p1-p29 0.064 * 0.038 -800 22,800 -0.002
p30-p39 0.040 0.028 5,300 27,300 0.008
p40-p79 0.010 *** 0.002 134,400 25,400 0.053
p80-p89 0.007 *** 0.002 293,600 32,800 0.067
(B) p90-p99 0.008 *** 0.001 573,400 38,700 0.122
Other assets
p1-p29 0.016 * 0.009 -3,500 22,800 -0.003
p30-p39 0.094 *** 0.027 6,900 27,300 0.024
p40-p79 0.032 *** 0.005 14,000 25,400 0.018
p80-p89 0.014 *** 0.004 35,600 32,800 0.015
p90-p99 0.006 *** 0.001 242,400 38,700 0.039
Control  variables yes
R² 0.195
Computation of elasticitiesRegression results
(1)
Marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth
55 
 
Table C2 (continued). Robustness of regression results: Considering 5 wealth groups instead of 4 
groups 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets). Other 
control variables: income expectations, age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit constraint, 
unemployment episodes, sick leaves. 
OLS estimates. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
  
Specification
-2 -3 (4)=(1)*(2)/(3)
W C 
Consumption 
elasticity to 
wealth
Wealth percentile 
dummy Coefficient Std. Err. (mean - euros)  (mean-euros)
Financia l  assets
p1-p29 0.445 *** 0.052 2,100 22,800 0.041
p30-p39 0.152 *** 0.028 16,300 27,300 0.091
p40-p79 0.025 *** 0.006 29,100 25,400 0.029
p80-p89 0.023 *** 0.007 71,100 32,800 0.049
p90-p99 0.002 0.001 263,000 38,700 0.013
Main res idence
p1-p29 0.162 * 0.084 1,200 22,800 0.009
p30-p39 0.024 0.030 4,900 27,300 0.004
( C) p40-p79 0.009 *** 0.002 118,300 25,400 0.044
p80-p89 0.008 *** 0.002 241,200 32,800 0.061
p90-p99 0.008 *** 0.002 353,100 38,700 0.077
Other rea l  estate
p1-p29 0.070 * 0.038 -2,000 22,800 -0.006
p30-p39 0.064 ** 0.032 400 27,300 0.001
p40-p79 0.017 *** 0.006 16,000 25,400 0.011
p80-p89 0.004 0.005 52,400 32,800 0.006
p90-p99 0.008 * 0.001 220,300 38,700 0.046
Other assets
p1-p29 0.020 ** 0.009 -3,500 22,800 -0.003
p30-p39 0.108 *** 0.028 6,800 27,300 0.027
p40-p79 0.032 *** 0.005 14,000 25,400 0.018
p80-p89 0.014 *** 0.004 35,600 32,800 0.015
p90-p99 0.006 *** 0.001 242,400 38,700 0.039
Control  variables yes
R² 0.1959
Regression results Computation of elasticities
-1
Marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth
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Table C3. Controlling for geographical differences 
 
Dependent variable: ratio of non-durable consumption to income (excluding income from financial and housing assets). Other control 
variables: age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit constraint, unemployment episodes, sick 
leaves. OLS Estimates. Other control variables: age, work status, education of the reference person, household composition, credit 
constraint, unemployment episodes, sick leaves. Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10%. Econometric sample. 
  
Coeff. Std. Err.
Financia l  assets
p1-p49 0.117 *** 0.014
p50-p69 0.026 *** 0.008
p70-p89 0.015 *** 0.005
p90-p99 0.001 0.001
Main res idence
p1-p49 0.009 * 0.006
p50-p69 0.009 *** 0.002
p70-p89 0.009 *** 0.002
p90-p99 0.007 *** 0.002
Other rea l  estate 0.008 *** 0.001
Other assets 0.006 *** 0.001
Geographica l  controls
Area:Paris ian area ref. -
Area: Center 0.096 ** 0.048
Area: North 0.072 0.048
Area: East 0.081 0.052
Area: West 0.038 0.050
Area: South-west 0.067 0.048
Area: Center-west 0.038 0.052
Area: Mediteranean 0.074 0.050
Area: overseas  departments 0.063 0.049
urban (less  than 5,000 inhabitants) -0.043 0.055
urban (5,000 and 9,999 inhab) -0.076 0.053
urban (10,000-20,000 inhab) -0.042 0.052
urban( 20,000 and 50,000 inhab) -0.018 0.051
urban (50,000-100,000 inhab) -0.128 *** 0.053
urban (100,000-200,000 inhab) -0.009 0.053
urban (200,000-2,000,000 inhab) -0.045 0.051
Paris ref. -
Rura l  area -0.059 0.049
Other control  variables yes
R² 0.187
#observations 3,454
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Table C4 Comparing Indebted households with and without mortgages  
 
Source: French Wealth survey (Enquête Patrimoine 2010, Insee). Weighted Statistics. In the last column,** indicates significant 
differences (at the 5% level) in the mean values of the household characteristic between household with and without mortgages 
(columns 3 and 4) among indebted households holding one property or more. 
All households 
All 
households 
holding one 
property or 
more
With at least 
one mortgage 
With other loans  (and 
no mortgage)
(mean values) (mean values) (mean values)
Wealth and income 
Gross  wealth 259,000 413,500 460,600 429,200
Net wealth 229,300 366,800 346,700 350,200
Financia l  assets 50,800 72,800 52,200 61,600
Main res idence 122,400 204,700 229,600 212,700 **
Other rea l  estate 38,100 63,800 84,800 61,800 **
Other assets  47,600 72,200 93,900 87,100
Income (excluding income from hous ing and financia l  assets ) 32,600 38,300 46,000 44,200 **
Total  debt 31,700 49,800 121,200 71,500 **
Debt Service 3,400 5,200 12,000 7,700 **
Asset holding (% of HH)
household main res idence 0.552 0.924 0.950 0.924 **
Other rea l  estate 0.199 0.333 0.316 0.322
Bus iness 0.156 0.219 0.283 0.236 **
Demographics
Age
25 to 29 0.115 0.032 0.049 0.046
30 to 39 0.173 0.145 0.289 0.213 **
40 to 49 0.180 0.193 0.351 0.253 **
50 to 59 0.175 0.213 0.211 0.257 **
60 to 69 0.158 0.197 0.083 0.179 **
70 to 75 0.113 0.133 0.011 0.044 **
More than 75 0.086 0.088 0.006 0.008
Employment status
Sel f-employed 0.063 0.080 0.141 0.108 **
Employee 0.488 0.470 0.735 0.635 **
Retired 0.345 0.407 0.087 0.224 **
Unemployed 0.058 0.019 0.022 0.019
Others 0.046 0.025 0.015 0.014
Education
No diploma 0.184 0.147 0.107 0.094
Primary or Secondary 0.447 0.466 0.377 0.436 **
Baccalaureate 0.134 0.123 0.161 0.145
Post-secondary 0.104 0.110 0.174 0.137 **
Tertiary 0.133 0.152 0.181 0.188
# observations 15,006 10,710 1,681 4,200
Indebted households holding one 
property or more
